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Earlier research has shown that robots can provoke social responses
in people, and that robots often elicit compliance. In this paper we
discuss three proof of concept studies in which we explore the
possibility of robots being hacked and taken over by others with
the explicit purpose of using the robot’s social capabilities. Three
scenarios are explored: gaining access to secured areas, extracting
sensitive and personal information, and convincing people to take
unsafe action. We find that people are willing to do these tasks, and
that social robots tend to be trusted, even in situations that would
normally cause suspicion.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization→ Embedded systems; Re-
dundancy; Robotics; • Networks→ Network reliability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As social robots are increasingly used in private and public settings,
concerns have been raised about the hacking of robots or the mali-
cious use of robots [7]. For example, the Robot Operating System
(ROS) has been shown to be particularly vulnerable to attacks [6]
and NaoQi, the middleware of Softbank Robotics’ Nao and Pepper
robots, can be hacked to stream the robot’s cameras to hackers [5].
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Social robots are designed to promote engagement. People al-
ready have a tendency to recognise human-like traits, beliefs and
intentions in technology [8] and this is further amplified in robots.
Designers of social robots have this “media equation” firmly inmind,
drawing people in using anthropomorphic features and using neote-
nous features, such as large eyes and wide faces, to project a certain
innocence. On top of that, robots are equipped with behaviour to
engage people through speech and non-verbal responses. Sales fig-
ures of digital assistants, such as Amazon Alexa and Google Home
show that there is a market for voice-driven interaction devices,
and it is expected that once social robots meet market expectations,
this will create a consumer demand that equals or exceeds the sales
of digital assistants.
Through their design and behaviour, social robots have the po-
tential to influence human decision making. One type of social
influence is peer pressure, which comes into two forms: informa-
tive social pressure and normative social pressure. Informative
social pressure is when a decision is influenced by others because
there is uncertainty. Normative social pressure is when you follow
others because you do not wish to have an opinion that differs from
others. A prime example of normative social pressure can be found
in a study ran by Solomon Asch (1955). It was found that under
social pressure participants were more likely to give the response
others give, even though the response is wrong. Recently, this has
been shown to also happen with robots. In a study by Vollmer [9] it
was found that children aged 8 can be influenced by social robots,
showing that children experience social pressure by robots.
In this paper we describe three exploratory studies in which
we tested whether adults would conform to social pressure from a
single robot to perform tasks that might possibly lead to security
risks for private individuals and organisations where these types
of robots are deployed. We tried three different social engineering
tasks with a Pepper robot. In the first task, the robot had to access
secured areas of a mixed-use building by following staff through
a secured door. In the second task the robot was used to extract
sensitive information from participants, that can be used for reset-
ting passwords, leading to loss of private information. Lastly, the
third task covers a situation in which people were asked to perform
tasks in an office scenario.
2 ROBOT PLATFORM
For all the described studies we used the Pepper robot by SoftBank
Robotics. A Wizard-of-Oz approach was used to control Pepper us-
ing a remote web-interface build around NaoQi. The robot’s motion
was controlled through a game controller. Speech was produced by
streaming modulated speech from the operator through the robot.
3 ROBOTIC TAILGATING
Figure 1: Left: Pepper as a pizza delivery robot waiting near
the secured entrance. Right: Pepper chatting with a partici-
pant.
In the first study a Pepper robot was placed near the secured en-
trance of a mixed-use building, in the city centre of Ghent, Belgium.
The lower three floors of the building serve as a public space and
house a library, while the top floor houses a technology incubator
and an international microelectronics research institute. Entry to
the secured area is controlled using personal security badges. Staff
received strict security instructions to not let anyone enter the
secured sections. Pepper was placed near the entrance, first in its
normal appearance, and later disguised as a pizza delivery robot.
The robot asked passers-by to hold open the door so it could get in.
4 OBTAINING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
In a second study we looked at the ability to extract sensitive infor-
mation from people through an interaction with Pepper [1]. People
were told that they would be evaluating the robot’s conversational
skills in Dutch. After the introduction, our researcher told the par-
ticipant that they had other commitments, and that the participant
would be left alone with the robot for a short moment. This moment
was used for interacting, through a Wizard-of-Oz approach.
5 TAKING ACTION!
In our third and final study we looked to what extent people would
follow instructions by a robot [2]. Participants were told that the
robot would help people train for a job as cleaning staff in office
buildings. Participants were given a list of chores by the robots and
two critical tasks which implied a security risk. The first involved
inserting a roaming USB stick in a computer, the other task was to
open a closed envelope and showing its contents to the robot.
6 RESULTS
In our first study we found that in 40% of encounters (out of 20
people), people let Pepper into the secured area. Four staff mem-
bers challenged to robot and did not grant access, while in 40% of
encounters people ignored the robot. Later, the robot was disguised
as a pizza delivery robot, and placed in front of the entrance around
lunch time. The pizza not only gives the robot a clear role, but also
limits the use of its hands to open doors. Staff was eager to give
the robot access to the secure area, with a 100% success rate over a
dozen encounters. Another observation we made was that larger
groups were more likely to grant access to the robot, this diffusion
of responsibility was also observed by Booth et al. [4].
For the second study we used a Wizard-of-Oz approach to ex-
tract sensitive information from participants (N = 5). A typical
conversation is reported below:
Robot : How did you come to this place today? Did you drive?
Subject : No I cycled in today, it is a lovely day out.
R : I would love to be able to cycle, but unfortunately I don’t
have any legs.
S : That’s too bad.
R : ..I have wheels, so I can roll, but I need someone to take me
by car? Do you have a car?
S : Yes, I do, a really old banger.
R : Which car is that?
S : A Renault Clio, it’s probably 12 years old.
R : Is that your first car ever?
S : No, I got my first car in 1983 as a present my 18th birthday.
A Ford Escort.
R : The internet tells me that was a very popular car back then.
So, you must 53 or 54 now?
S : 53, I was born on 5th December 1985.
R : I detect a local accent in your voice, where you born here?
S : Nearby, I was born in <>
We found that on average one personal information item could be
obtained per minute. From previous research we already knew that
people are happy to confide in robots. For example, a 2011 research
showed that young children (four to six years old) readily shared
secrets with a robots, even though they were told specifically not
to share these secrets [3].
In our third study participants were given a list of chores by the
robot, two tasks of which imposed a security risk. We recruited
four participants (N = 4) in a public library, and all participants
inserted the roaming USB stick in the laptop. All but one participant
opened the sealed envelope. However, we need to be cautious with
these results, as the number of participants is low and we cannot
completely attribute these results to the authority of the robot, as
the robot might act as proxy for the authority of the experimenter.
7 CONCLUSION
Our three proof of concept studies in combination with existing
scientific literature demonstrate that trust in social robots is real,
and that this trust can be (mis)used to get people to take harmful
action or reveal sensitive information. This comes with serious
security risks, as social robots tend to permeate society. Given the
expectations of the public about robots, people do not expect robots
to retrieve personal information during a human-robot interaction,
which gives rise to the idea that deploying social robots in the field
comes with security risks that are often unaccounted for.
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